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The concept of history was developed in a great array of directions during the period 
of Modern German Philosophy. Ranging from macrostructural analyses of the 
evolution of civilizations to descriptions of the temporal social experience of the 
individual it was essentially a critical concept, one which would seek to expose the 
allegedly naïve idea of the fixed properties of culture and of the individuals who 
might live within them. Adorno belongs to this tradition of critical historical 
philosophy. His philosophy of history is strongly marked by various Hegelian, 
Marxian, Nietzschean and hermeneutical ideas. A preoccupation with the idea of 
history is evident from the very beginnings of Adorno’s career. From his 
Habilitationsschrift (1931) right up to Aesthetic Theory (incomplete at the time of his 
death in 1969) the issue is never far from central. To deal comprehensively with the 
range of influences and the multiplicity of applications of the concept of history in 
Adorno’s work would be co-extensive with a critical analysis of his oeuvre. What this 
chapter will restrict itself to is Adorno’s engagements with what might be specifically 
regarded as ‘theories of history.’ The topics to be examined are Adorno’s critique of 
(1) the idea of universal history and (2) of progress, (3) his dialectical reading of the 
idea of natural history, and (4) his assessment of role of the totality in the production 
of history. 
 
1. Universal History 
                                                 
* Pre-publication draft of: ‘Adorno: Philosophy of History’, in Adorno: Key Concepts (London: 
Acumen, 2008), ed. Deborah Cook (pp.179-195) 
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The German Idealist philosophies of history were essentially philosophies of progress. 
Their theories rested heavily on the hypothesis of the existence of some collective 
phenomenon – the human species, civilization, or human spirit – which can be 
interpreted as undergoing improvement across time. This process of improvement can 
be explained through ‘universal history,’ a narrative which traverses and somehow 
unites all historical epochs. The language of maturity, of completion, of realization is 
central to this narrative.   
 The idealist theory of history might be quickly rejected on the basis of its 
naïve optimism and its metaphysical assumptions. Adorno recognizes the fundamental 
difficulties of the theory of universal history. Yet it is through critical engagement 
with this theory that Adorno’s distinctive articulation of the concepts of history and 
progress is achieved. As he programmatically announces: ‘If you wish to say anything 
at all about the theory of history in general, you must enter into a discussion of the 
construction of universal history’ (HF, 81).1 
It is important to be aware that Adorno’s conception of the challenge of 
universal history takes different forms in the course of his career. Aspects of the 
position set out in the 1930s were sometimes subsequently reshaped by a 
philosophically expressed sense of crisis caused by the historical experience of the 
Holocaust. Before the war Adorno’s approach to the concept of history might be 
construed as a radical hermeneutics, one which sets out to demonstrate the failure of 
the philosophical pretension to have achieved a totalistic grasp of the world. In a 
lecture of 1931 Adorno states: ‘Whoever chooses philosophy as a profession today 
must first reject the illusion that earlier philosophical enterprises began with: that the 
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power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real.’2 The position that 
begins to emerge from Dialectic of Enlightenment onwards (first edition in 1944) 
encompasses this view, but is not quite the same. It might be characterized as the 
effort to explore the destructive evolution of modernity with particular attention to the 
dynamics which reduce the possibilities of experience, a reduction which facilitated 
the perpetration of the Holocaust. Adorno and Horkheimer write: ‘we had set 
ourselves nothing less than the discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a 
truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.’3 Positions developed 
before and after the war overlap at important points, however, leading to some 
tensions within Adorno’s theory of history which become particularly evident in his 
critique of the idea of universal history. The impact of this tension will become clear 
once Adorno’s fundamental commitments have been clarified. 
 At first sight Adorno’s position will seem straightforwardly declinist. 
Declinism supposes some satisfactory state of affairs which has come to be eroded by 
a clearly identifiable, irrevocable, and inevitable historical process. Adorno is 
ostensibly committed to such a view when, in Negative Dialectics, he writes: ‘No 
universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading 
from the slingshot to the atom bomb’ (ND, 320).4 This is one of Adorno’s most 
quoted passages, but it requires cautious interpretation as by itself it appears to 
propose a one-dimensional trajectory of destruction in bald opposition to the 
narratives of progress embodied by the idealist notion of universal history.  
                                                 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Benjamin Snow, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy,’ p. 24, in The Adorno Reader, 
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4 
 Although Adorno engages considerably with Kant’s theory of history it is to 
Hegel’s version of the notion of universal history that he gives greatest attention.5 The 
problems of Hegel’s philosophy of history are well known: individual freedom is 
subordinated to the unfolding of Geist (spirit); the horrifying episodes of history are 
justified as contributions to the maturation of Geist; Geist is one of modern 
philosophy’s outstandingly gratuitous metaphysical theses. Hegel’s theory, troubling 
though it may be, is nevertheless a powerful effort to ground the belief that there is 
something distinctive and superior about the period of modernity, a period for which 
all previous history has been somehow preparatory. Adorno sees Hegel’s position as 
‘seemingly absurd – masterfully absurd’ (HF, 84). It is masterfully absurd in that it – 
like no other theory before or since – deals comprehensively with modernity’s deepest 
assumption – the continuity of progress: universal history. 
 The very idea of universal history presupposes that time has a particular 
structure. Adorno with Horkheimer observes that the idea of universal history requires 
the foundation of a certain beginning – a certain point in the past – from which all 
subsequent events progressively follow. This is not simply a rational requirement of 
the theory, however. It is a thesis which enables authoritative claims about the shape 
of the present to be made: ‘Through the establishment of a unique past, the cycle takes 
on the character of inevitability… makes the new appear as pre-determined.’6 The 
present is justified because it is inevitable, and its inevitability is explained through its 
emergence from a certain point in the past. 
 Adorno’s reaction to this thesis is not simply to turn it on its head. He does not 
assert the discontinuity of historical facts nor the disconnectedness of historical 
events. As Simon Jarvis notes, Adorno ‘is not satisfied with presentation of history as 
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5 
sheer discontinuity, as though there were no connection whatsoever between different 
“epochs.”’7 The idea of history as essentially discontinuous, as an unstructured 
collection of disconnected events, is, in fact, the positivist view which Adorno 
dismisses on the grounds that this view would encourage us to endorse ‘pure facticity 
as the only thing to be known and therefore to be accepted’ (ND, 319-320). Again, 
Hegel’s ‘masterfully absurd’ system had brought the modernist notion of continuity to 
its fullest and most significant articulation. To reject it, as the positivist must, would 
be to reject without reflection a belief that has been part of modernity’s self-
understanding. 
 Nevertheless, the idea of the continuity of history, as expressed by universal 
history, cannot be endorsed in that it cannot be articulated without doing violence to 
historical facts and thereby becoming a metaphysics detached from material reality. 
What Adorno proposes is to modify the thesis of continuity by placing it in dialectical 
tension with the notion of the discontinuity of history. Discontinuity is posited as a 
feature of history, not as the alterative theory of history. Discontinuity as the basic 
condition of history would preclude positivistically consciousness of the presence of 
patterns or forces of which historical actors are not always aware.  
 What the notion of ‘discontinuity’ is trying to capture is the idea that events 
and their actions are not intelligible simply as moments of time would be, that is as 
transition points in the space between past and future. Events possess a significance – 
a structure – that is not made intelligible by reading them as either as the explication 
or development of earlier events, or as embryonic versions of later ones: ‘History is 
not an equation, an analytic judgment. To think of it this way is to exclude from the 
                                                 
7 Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 37. 
6 
very outset the possibility of anything qualitatively different.’8 Adorno insists that 
there are – contrary to all the universal narratives – qualitative differences across 
history. It is in the 1932 essay on ‘natural history’ – an essay to which Adorno returns 
in the Negative Dialectics of 1966 – that Adorno sets out the framework within which 
his analysis is to take place: ‘history, as it lies before us, presents itself as thoroughly 
discontinuous, not only in that it contains disparate circumstances and facts, but also 
because it contains structural disparities.’9 These events are disruptive in that, we 
might say, they develop forms of life unique to themselves, not forms which are 
intelligible as incremental advances on their predecessors. This is the reality that 
prompts the hermeneutical task, or philosophy as interpretation.10 The example of 
democracy illuminates this difficulty. The Greeks are generally acknowledged as the 
progenitors of the institution of democracy. Yet their version is also recognized as 
being not only different from that of today but as containing elements quite anathema 
to our idea of democracy. In spite of that the two versions are lined up at various 
points in a continuum and the incommensurabilities that are evident are glossed over 
as something quite incidental. It is precisely this kind of thinking which the idea of 
universal history embodies. Adorno rejects it in the name of the disparities that cannot 
be dismissed as incidental. He writes with his early essay in mind: ‘The truth is that, 
while the traditional view inserts facts into the flow of time, they really possess a 
nucleus of time in themselves, they crystallize time in themselves. What we can 
legitimately call ideas is the nucleus of time within the individual crystallized 
phenomena, something that can only be decoded by interpretation. In accordance with 
                                                 
8 Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Samuel and Shierry Weber, ‘Spengler after the Decline,’ p. 66, in Prisms 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981).  
9 Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor, ‘The Idea of Natural History’, Telos, no. 60, (Summer 
1984), p. 122. 
10 This is the central contention of ‘The Actuality of Philosophy,’ in which the business of science is 
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this we might say that history is discontinuous in the sense that it represents life 
perennially disrupted’ (HF, 91). 
 We can see Adorno’s substantiation of this idea of disruptive history in his 
discussion of aesthetic phenomena. Art, he argues, is a constitutively historical 
phenomenon, not the material manifestation of atemporal aesthetic norms. Endorsing 
the Hegelian precept he writes that the ‘vision of the possible death of art accords 
with the fact that art is a product of history.’11 This historical substance of art is 
embraced in authentic art: ‘authentic works are those that surrender themselves to the 
historical substance of their age without reservation.’12 In this way, however, they are 
disruptive phenomena in that they are ‘crystallized phenomena,’ nuclei of time. This 
is the point at issue in Adorno’s claim that ‘history is not external to the work.’13 The 
intrinsic historicality of the work, however, renders aesthetic experience problematic 
if the experience is not contemporaneous with the production of the artwork: 
‘Artworks may be all the more truly experienced the more their historical substance is 
that of the one who experiences it.’14 
 As mentioned, Adorno does not intend to replace the notion of universal 
history with that of discontinuity. He writes ‘discontinuity and universal history must 
be conceived together’ (ND, 319). What emerges from this synthetic thought is the 
idea of history ‘perennially disrupted.’ The continuity of the historical process is 
                                                 
11 Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory (London: Athlone Press, 1997), p. 3. 
12 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 182. 
13 Quoted by Susan Buck-Morss in The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter 
Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (Sussex: The Harverster Press, 1977), p. 43. 
14 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 183. Interpretation in this way needs to be more than the hermeneutic 
treatment of historical experience. Adorno writes against Dilthey that he ‘did not engage facticity with 
sufficient seriousness; he remained in the sphere of intellectual history and in the fashion of vague 
categories of styles of though entirely failed to grasp material reality.’ Adorno, ‘The Idea of Natural 
History,’ p. 122. 
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explicable only as a series of disruptions. It is this that Adorno seems to mean when 
he proposes that ‘[h]istory is the unity of continuity and discontinuity’ (ND, 320).15  
 We must ask, though, what the unifying dimension could be. It cannot, after 
all, be adequate to say that what unifies history is that it has no unity. What Adorno in 
fact suggests is that ‘the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered 
moments and phases of history’ is ‘the unity of the control of nature, progressing to 
rule over men, and finally to that over men’s inner nature’ (ND, 320). In so far as this 
is Adorno’s position it is not unproblematic for the obvious reason that a narrative of 
the continuing control of nature is not discontinuous at all: the periods of ‘crystallized 
time’ (which we saw in Adorno’s hermeneutic mood) turn out to be commensurable 
in so far as they share the dimension of domination. Ultimately Adorno’s articulation 
of a dialectical structure of history, in which continuity and discontinuity are straining 
at each other, seems to favour a narrative which – in terms of the specifics of history 
at which it points – has a clear trajectory. Adorno’s radical hermeneutics collides with 
a critical theory driven by the question of barbarism. It is the latter that is pre-eminent 
but this pre-eminence deprives Adorno of the space in which to position a unity of 
continuity and discontinuity. Although Adorno is theoretically committed to the 
discontinuous dimensions – the ‘crystallized phenomena’ – he assumes in practice the 
intelligibility of historical events through the perspective of the destruction of nature, 
and that reopens the possibility that he is engaged in a declinist universal history. 
 A possible defence might be garnered from one of Adorno’s thoughts in 
Minima Moralia. There he writes: ‘If Benjamin said that history had hitherto been 
written from the standpoint of the victor, and needed to be written from that of the 
                                                 
15 Mauro Bozzetti suggests that the opposition of continuity and discontinuity entails that ‘history must 
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vanquished, we might add that knowledge must indeed present the fatally rectilinear 
succession of victory and defeat, but should also address itself to those things which 
were not embraced by this dynamic, which fell by the wayside – what might be called 
the waste products and blind spots that have escaped the dialectic.’16 This allusive 
passage refers to the continuity of domination (‘the fatally rectilinear succession of 
victory and defeat’) whilst also encompassing the sense of discontinuity (‘the waste 
products and blind spots,’ the non-identical elements that cannot be encompassed 
within the grand narrative17). Also significant perhaps is Adorno’s view of Spengler’s 
declinism. He dismisses its inevitabilist mechanisms of ‘plant-like growth and cultural 
decay’18 and criticizes Spengler’s commitment to an ineluctable history of 
domination: ‘His entire image of history is measured by the ideal of domination. His 
affinity for this ideal gives him profound insight whenever it is a question of the 
possibilities of domination and blinds him with hatred as soon as he is confronted by 
impulses which go beyond all previous history as the history of domination.’19 Within 
the history of domination – the continuous – there are moments which do not conform 
to the narrative, moments which in the end require the sort of historical interpretation 
informed by Adorno’s hermeneutical background. Nevertheless the very status of the 
discontinuous – as that which is non-identical with the narrative of universal history – 
subordinates its fundamental meaning to that of continuity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Edmund Jephcott, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life 
(London: NLB, 1974), § 98, p. 151. 
17 Apropos: ‘The materialistic turnabout in dialectic cast the weightiest accent on insight into the 
discontinuity of what is not comfortingly held together by any unity of [the Hegelian notion of] spirit 
and concept’ (ND, 319). 
18 Adorno, ‘Spengler after the Decline,’ p. 54. 
19 Adorno, ‘Spengler after the Decline,’ p. 61. 
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2. Progress 
The claims of progress are criticized in Adorno’s philosophy by means of the thesis of 
discontinuity. The disruptive phases of history deny the possibility of modernity’s 
narrative of its own continuing improvement. Importantly, though, critical theory 
must retain, in some form, the very idea of progress. Through its critique of society 
critical theory understands itself to be contributing to a process of amelioration in 
which, for instance, reification might end. As a process the possibility of this critically 
induced progress cannot be explained by modifying the modernist teleology, that is, 
by disputing (against, say, some neo-Hegelian) the rightness of the present and 
pushing the telos, or goal of history, on to some further point in an indefinite future. 
Such a modification would be, in essence, an elongation of the universal history 
narrative. A new framework in which the concept of progress can be articulated needs 
to be developed. 
 Adorno’s idea of what needs to be considered in the development of this 
framework is strongly coloured by the influence of Walter Benjamin. It is Benjamin 
who pushes Adorno into a deeper appreciation of what is entailed in conventional 
presuppositions about the nature of history, presuppositions which lend themselves to 
the progress thesis. Benjamin’s thirteenth thesis on the philosophy of history states: 
‘Social Democratic theory, and even more its practice, has been formed by a 
conception of progress which did not adhere to reality but made dogmatic claims. 
Progress as pictured in the minds of Social Democrats was, first of all, the progress of 
mankind itself (and not just advances in men’s ability and knowledge). Secondly, it 
was something boundless, in keeping with the infinite perfectibility of mankind. 
Thirdly, progress was regarded as irresistible, something that automatically pursued a 
straight or spiral course. Each of these predicates is controversial and open to 
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criticism.’20 What Benjamin here furnishes Adorno with is the basis for reflections on 
the location of progress or on the relationship of progress to time. Adorno sees the 
concept of progress as faced by a dilemma: (a) progress cannot stand outside time, as 
something to be achieved only when history is somehow overcome,21 yet (b) to 
articulate progress within history is to assume the progressive trajectory of universal 
history, a trajectory which sees progress as constantly transcending itself. As Adorno 
writes: ‘If progress is equated with redemption as transcendental intervention per se, 
then it forfeits, along with the temporal dimension, its intelligible meaning and 
evaporates into historical theology. But if progress is mediated into history, then the 
idolization of history threatens and along with it… the absurdity that it is progress 
itself that inhibits progress’ (P, 147).22 The very possibility of progress must be set 
within temporality, yet not within the narrative of universal history.23 It requires a 
transformation of experience not a messianic transformation of time. 
 Adorno’s proposal for a way beyond this dilemma is what we might term a 
negativistic theory of progress. He states it in the specific concrete terms ‘of whether 
humanity is capable of preventing catastrophe’ (P, 144). He comments: ‘I believe that 
you should start by taking progress to mean this very simple thing: that it would be 
better if people had no cause to fear: if there were no impending catastrophe on the 
horizon… For progress today really does mean simply the prevention and avoidance 
of total catastrophe’ (HF, 143). This is the catastrophe brought about by allegedly 
                                                 
20 Walter Benjamin, tr. Harry Zohn, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” pp. 262-263, in 
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Fontana, 1973). 
21 This is a very fundamental commitment which might be set against those readings of Adorno that 
align him with theological or messianic readings of history. As an instance of this see Rolf 
Wiggershaus, Theodor W. Adorno (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1987), pp. 31-32. 
22 P = Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Henry W. Pickford, ‘Progress,’ in Critical Model: Interventions and 
Catchwords (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
23 Adorno’s criticism of Kierkegaard’s notion of the ‘leap of faith’ takes this same form, arguing that 
the leap represents an abandonment of the historical moment: ‘Precisely as the “leap,” however, the 
appearance of the first is abstractly set apart from historical continuity; it becomes a mere means for the 
inauguration of a new sphere.’ Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Kierkegaard: 
Construction of the Aesthetic (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 34. 
12 
progressive social integration achieved through the technologization of the lifeworld. 
For Adorno the results of this integration are exemplified in the administered murder 
of the millions during the Holocaust: ‘Genocide is the absolute integration’ (ND, 362). 
The question of the possibility of progress is set within history, yet it is not committed 
to a narrative of increasing improvement or progressions. It is negativistic in the sense 
that progress is intelligible only in so far as it is the prevention of catastrophe. 
 Adorno argues that a fundamental assumption needs to be abandoned if this 
alternative conception of progress is to be achieved. This is the assumption – as we 
saw above – identified by Benjamin: ‘Progress as pictured in the minds of Social 
Democrats was, first of all, the progress of mankind itself.’ This conventional 
assumption is, as Benjamin says, open to criticism, but it is Adorno who develops the 
criticism. He writes: ‘no progress is to be assumed that would imply that humanity in 
general already existed and therefore could progress. Rather progress would be the 
very establishment of humanity in the first place… the concept of universal history 
cannot be saved; it is plausible only so long as one can believe in the illusion of an 
already existing humanity, coherent in itself and moving upward as a unity’ (P, 145). 
What Adorno is contending is that the notion of progress has supposed that there is a 
point from which progress can proceed. But he argues that we are not yet in some 
historical continuum in which we can say that such progress is plausible. It is this 
thought that gives rise to the negativistic idea, in Adorno, that the process in which 
progress might take place has yet to begin (through avoidance of the threat generated 
by history). Progress is therefore not continuity, but a negation of the conditions of 
prior history: progress is ‘resistance to the perceptual danger of relapse’ (P, 160). It is 
on this basis that Adorno understands progress to contain the ‘aspect of redemption’ 
(P, 148), albeit in a non-theological sense for the reason we have seen above. 
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 It is in this way that the dilemma of progress is addressed. Progress is neither a 
detemporalizing act, since it is intelligible precisely as a response to historical 
experience, but nor is it not simply part of the historical continuum in that it 
represents a disruption of that process. The way out of this dilemma requires that we 
break what Adorno terms the ‘magic spell’ of progress, the belief of modernity that 
every new institution, for instance, is an incremental improvement on its predecessor 
(P, 150). The catastrophe threatens for so long as we fail to realize that ‘the spell’ 
assures us that progress will prevail. As we saw Benjamin state, we must criticize the 
idea that progress is ‘irresistible, something that automatically pursued a straight or 
spiral course.’ Such a view is the spell, which Adorno dialectically rejects in the very 
name of progress: ‘it could be said that progress occurs where it ends’ (P, 150). 
 
3. Natural History 
Adorno’s idea of natural history is a critical concept. It specifically brings into 
question the dualistic division of realms of human experience into the natural and 
historical. Adorno sets out to dissolve this dualism by showing that what is identified 
as natural bears historical dimensions, whilst what seems to be historical has natural 
foundations. 
 Adorno describes his critical approach as follows: ‘I think that the attempt 
should be made to behold all nature, and whatever regards itself as nature, as history’ 
(HF, 124). What this involves is analysis of the concept of the natural, one which 
Adorno likens to ‘the concept of myth.’24 Mythic experience is that of forces that both 
transcend human beings and cannot be altered by them. However, myths are, of 
course, the products of human culture. The notion of the dissolution of the mythic – of 
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the natural into the historical – is one of the fundamental tasks of the ‘consciousness 
raising’ programme of Adorno’s critical theory. Typical of this programme is the 
following remark: ‘The mythic scientific respect of the peoples of the earth for the 
status quo, that they themselves unceasingly produce, itself finally becomes positive 
fact.’25 
 This is no value free account of the how the social world evolves, of how the 
concept of nature can be shown to have been produced by our social practices.26 The 
historical processes in which our concepts of nature has been produced are those in 
which we have come to appropriate it and for Adorno these appropriations are 
destructive. The history of this process of appropriation begins with the efforts of 
human beings to free themselves from nature, ‘that mere state of nature from which it 
had estranged itself with so huge an effort.’27 This is, in fact, the primal history of 
subjectivity, the history of the emergence of subjectivity. (This primal history has 
been heavily criticized for, amongst other things, its tendency to eternalize a particular 
version of subjectivity and for its apparent over-reach.28) However, this emergence is 
a ‘two sided process’ which also takes the path of the domination of nature.29 Günter 
Rohrmoser puts it as follows: ‘Man cannot free himself from the natural state without 
overcoming nature and thereby mastering it.’30 Adorno describes this as a ‘reductio ad 
                                                 
25 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 41. 
26 One of Adorno’s cue notes to himself for the lecture series Freedom and History states: ‘Laws of 
Nature not to be taken literally, not to be ontologized. In other words, the laws of nature capable of 
being abrogated’ (HF, 115). 
27 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 31. 
28 See Jürgen Habermas, tr. Thomas McCarthy, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I (London: 
Heinemann, 1984), p. 380 and Hauke Brunkhorst, Adorno and Critical Theory (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1999), p. 73. 
29 ‘The substance of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s thesis is that the process of civilization is already 
marked from its origins, by a fatal dialectic, because the emancipation of men from scarcity, from 
subjugation to natural powers and to their own natural appetites, is achieved through a two sided 
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tied to domination and repression.’ Stefano Petrucciani, Introduzione a Adorno (Rome: Editori Laterza, 
2007), p. 53. 
30 Günter Rohrmoser, Das Elend der kritischen Theorie (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Rombach, 1970) 
p. 14. 
15 
hominem,’31 a process of manipulation in which nature is unconsciously defined by 
the needs of human beings. Adorno and Horkheimer write: ‘What men want to learn 
from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men.’32 What is 
not understood here, though, is the degree to which we have appropriated nature. 
There is no consciousness of the fact that our concept of nature as something other 
than us is a product of our historical efforts to emerge from it. Instead we persist with 
the ‘mythic’ image of nature as something simply there without history. 
 Adorno tries to show that just as nature has a history, history too has its 
relation to nature. This side of the dialectical conception of natural history criticizes 
the hypostatization of human history and human accomplishment. The Enlightenment 
philosophical claim – made most powerfully by Kant – of the achievement of reason 
misconstrues reason as something above nature. Adorno argues that it is, in fact, a 
piece of natural history. In this regard he discusses the idea of transcendental thought 
– the idea that there are certain atemporal conditions of experience – and rereads them 
as a means by which the natural business of self-preservation is conducted: ‘The 
definition of the transcendental as that which is necessary, a definition added to 
functionality and generality, expresses the principle of the self-preservation of the 
species. It provides a legal basis for abstraction, which we cannot do without, for 
abstraction is the medium of self-preserving reason’ (ND, 179). As the philosophical 
expression of a mode of self-preservation it must be traced back to a natural drive. In 
                                                 
31 Theodor W. Adorno, tr. Glyn Adey and David Frisby, ‘Introduction to the Positivist Dispute,’ p. 6, in 
Theodor W. Adorno et al, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1976). 
32 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 4. As Alison Stone points out, ‘Adorno 
asserts that nature is historical, but in a distinctive way. The history that shapes natural things, for 
Adorno, is the history of human efforts to dominate them, to mould them to human purposes in a way 
that negates their spontaneous modes of being.’ Alison Stone, ‘Adorno and the Disenchantment of 
Nature,’ Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 32 (2006), p. 242. 
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this way, as Deborah Cook writes, ‘the historical course of reason must be charted 
with reference to its relationship to the embodied subject and its drives.’33 
  Adorno’s dissolution of the dualism of nature and history applies with 
particular political intent to what, following the usage of Lukács, he calls second 
nature, ‘this world of things created by man, yet lost to him, the world of 
convention.’34 Adorno’s work contains numerous efforts at revealing the historical 
aspects in ‘the semblance of the natural’ (HF, 121). Most centrally the idea that 
capitalism represents a natural form of social organization is exposed as ideology. 
Indeed one might think of Adorno’s Ideologiekritik as the critical investigation and 
exposure of ‘second nature.’ The narratives of universal history are also to be 
criticized as narratives of ‘second nature.’ Following the same thought Adorno alleges 
that Hegel’s concept of ‘world-spirit’ ‘is the ideology of natural history’ (ND, 365) in 
that it represents the process of domination as a dimension of the inevitable unfolding 
of world history. The philosophical dynamic which would ontologize realms of 
experience – render them beyond the reach of alterability and human history – is also 
an instance of the creation of this second nature. In this regard Adorno instances the 
mathematical method of modern philosophy which, he claims, ‘transforms logic by 
magic into a second nature and lends it the aura of ideal being.’35  
 In a number of discussions of the idea of natural history Adorno gives his 
position greater sharpness through opposition to Heidegger whose fundamental 
ontology provides an alternative account of the relationship between history and 
nature. According to Adorno, Heidegger’s idea of historical experience – which 
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Adorno describes as an ‘unhistorical concept of history’ (ND, 358) – fails to 
appreciate the entwinement of nature and history. This entwinement is a ‘painful 
antithesis’ (ND, 359) in so far as it is a story marked by the processes of domination. 
Adorno understands Heidegger’s idea of historicity – the idea of the historical 
experience of human beings – to be that history is a mode of human beings.36 This, for 
Adorno, amounts to an ontologization of history, in that it is a ‘historicity abstracted 
from historic existence’ (ND, 358-9). In other words, it posits a capacity – a historical 
capacity – without realizing that historical experience is tied to the effort to emerge 
from the natural condition. In Heidegger’s notion of historicity what is emphasized is 
the ‘project’ of Dasein, thereby missing the antagonistic relationship between history 
and nature. 
 
4. Totality 
History takes a particular direction in the dynamics of what Adorno discusses under 
the idea of the social totality. He holds that the social totality determines the 
individual within it and increasingly brings all features of social life under these 
determinations. Because this relentless process of integration is incompatible with a 
critical consciousness it is threatening to lead us to catastrophe. At the same time, in a 
thinly hopeful possibility, only a collective subject would have the capacity to bring 
about resistance to the possibility of catastrophe.  
 Adorno’s idea of totality is a complex critical reconstruction of the Hegelian 
notion of Geist. In Hegel’s account of progress, as discussed above, the agency of 
history – and therefore the repository and agent of its progress and continuity – is 
Geist. In his materialist reconstruction of Hegel Adorno rereads the dynamic of Geist 
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as the dynamic of the social totality: ‘The world spirit is; but it is not a spirit’ (ND, 
304).37 He offers a number of criticisms which try to show that the world spirit is, 
rather, a hypostasized historical-social process in which individual agency becomes 
subsumed in a self-reproducing totality. It is an understanding of this integrationist 
dynamic which is forms a key part of Adorno’s philosophy of history. 
 Adorno’s thesis is that what makes society a totality – that is, a phenomenon 
over and above a collection of discreet facts about individuals and institutions – is that 
its cohesiveness is generated by a particular system of economic activity. This system, 
according to Adorno, comes ever more to determine all phenomena which appear 
within society. He writes: ‘What really makes society a social entity, what constitutes 
it both conceptually and in reality, is the relationship of exchange which binds 
together virtually all the people participating in this kind of society.’38 This binding is 
not, as the naïve view might see it, the necessity of commerce, one which in its 
present form innocently involves fiscal exchange. Rather, the very activity of fiscal 
exchange determines our fundamental sense of our social reality. It gives expression 
to and consolidates a principle of modern rationality, the principle of equivalence. 
What equivalence means in this context is that any given phenomenon – an object, a 
product, a process – may be made relative to any other phenomenon by means of their 
supposed common translatability into fiscal value. As Adorno puts it: ‘Bourgeois 
society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar comparable by reducing it to 
abstract quantities’ (ND, 7). 
 The rationality which is required for the effective operation of exchange is the 
prevailing social rationality. For Adorno the logic of exchange – a fundamental 
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instrument of capitalism – informs the very processes of socialization.39 Indeed 
Adorno claims that ‘the exchange process’ is ‘the underlying social fact through 
which socialization first comes about.’40 Set against this background the idea that 
society is simply the sum total of the individuals who live within it is oblivious to the 
fact that the consciousnesses of individuals are shaped by forces in some way external 
to them, by ‘the totality which they form.’41 This totality is ultimately a coercive 
historical process in which individuality is integrated to the requirements of the 
totality. And Adorno identities the prevalence of the exchange system as the 
ideational factor which stimulates this integration: ‘In the form of the exchange 
principle, the bourgeois ratio really approximated to the systems whatever it would 
make commensurable with itself, would identify with itself – and it did so with 
increasing, if potentially homicidal, success. Less and less was left outside’ (ND, 23, 
translation altered). This process of integration is what gives the history of the modern 
period – of the bourgeois age – its particular trajectory. The qualitatively different is 
brought ever closer through the increasing reach of the exchange system into all facets 
of life: ‘The exchange relationship largely endows the system with a mechanical 
character. It is objectively forced onto its elements, as implied by the concept of an 
organism – the model which resembles a celestial teleology through which each organ 
would receive its function in the whole and would derive its meaning from the latter. 
The context which perpetuates life simultaneously destroys it, and consequently 
already possesses in itself the lethal impulse towards which its dynamic is 
propelled.’42 
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  In dealing with Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan 
Point of View’ Adorno argues that the notion of progress has been intelligible in 
modernity as the growing sense of totality: Kant’s notion of progress is articulated as 
the increasing rational unity of humanity. Adorno claims, however, that the problem 
with this sense of totality as progress is that humanity is converted into a collective 
agent in pursuit of an ideal. This collectivization determines that history must pursue a 
particular path: ‘But the dependence of progress on the totality comes back to bite 
progress’ (P, 145). For Adorno, the integrationist dynamic of history, which 
understands progress as the development of the totality, is no progress at all: ‘If 
humanity remains entrapped by the totality it itself fashions, then, as Kafka said, no 
progress has taken place at all, while mere totality nevertheless allows progress to be 
entertained in thought’ (P, 145). 
 Adorno’s way of describing the dynamic which is driven by the social totality 
can make it appear to be a metaphysical thesis after all, one which in the Hegelian 
manner posits a driving evolutionary process over and above human beings. However, 
the very enterprise of critical theory cannot allow the possibility of a historical 
process in which human beings are merely the material cause. Adorno acknowledges 
that human agency – albeit a distorted one in the current age – is operative in this 
process: ‘Society is a total process in which human beings surrounded, guided, and 
formed by objectivity do, in turn, act back upon society,’43 or ‘Social totality does not 
lead a life of its own over and above that which it unites and of which it, in its turn, is 
composed. It produces and reproduces itself through its individual moments… System 
and individual entity are reciprocal and can only be apprehended in their 
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reciprocity.’44 The task of critical theory, of course, is to think through the conditions 
in which individuals might come to realize their capacity for agency, thereby 
reversing the destructive conditions of the totality, a phenomenon of second nature. 
 Adorno’s critique of the social totality – his view that the totality encroaches 
and determines the course of life – might seems to amount to an argument in favour of 
the pre-eminence of the individual moment. However, the social totality – as we have 
just seen – also contains a commitment to the contributions that collective agents 
make to the reality in which they live. In is on this basis that Adorno can deny that he 
is a radical pluralist who would reject the totality in favour of free self-determining 
individuals. He notes: ‘it would be simplistic if you were to assume that, in which I 
have called the historical process or the world spirit that gives shape to the totality and 
draws it into itself, it is the particular that is in the right… while the totality is in the 
wrong’ (HF, 95). What Adorno proposes, somewhat tentatively and without 
systematic elaboration, is the possibility that collective action alone might be the 
agent of ‘redemption.’ The individual as part of a self-conscious totality – as opposed 
to the individualist who does not realize the foundational dimensions of her social 
determination – would be part of this agency: ‘The forms of humanity’s own global 
societal constitution threatens its life, if a self-conscious global subject does not 
develop and intervene’ (P, 144). 
 What is at issue in the theory of progress is that progress – the step away from 
catastrophe – can only occur when a collective agency is achieved. In this way we see 
that the possibility of emancipation from the totality lies within the totality itself: the 
historical process of integration which provides a coercive totality might also provide 
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the conditions for an agency adequate to the action required to resist the integrational 
historical process. 
 What Adorno posits here is consistent with his response to the dilemma of 
progress, the dilemma of the end of history or progress as the continuity of universal 
history. The achievement of ‘a self-conscious global subject’ might indeed be ‘the 
very establishment of humanity.’ Central to Adorno’s contribution to this 
achievement is a critique of the naturalistic pretensions of the totalizing process. 
